Document of the week! The legitimization of the Castello Branco coup government: Lincoln Gordon and the United States government

Check out the full document in our collection: Telegram from Dean Rusk to the US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro regarding developments in Brazil

The legitimization of the Castello Branco coup government: Lincoln Gordon and the United States government

The United States government played an important role in 1964 business-military coup. This influence went beyond the political and ideological dimension, to also include the promise of logistical support for coup activities and recognition and economic aid to the illegitimate government that would be constituted. Furthermore, the North American ambassador to Brazil, Professor Lincoln Gordon – prestigious academic and one of the formulators of Alliance for Progress, a conditional economic aid arm implemented at the beginning of the decade – played a central role in the attempt to legitimize the coup government of White Castle, with whom he had a close relationship, in Congress and even in North American public opinion.

The actions to legitimize the post-Coup reality led by Gordon were effective and for a long time the US government maintained a view that the military government should be supported almost unconditionally, or that at least criticism should not be made publicly. but rather privately, among friends. After Gordon's departure as ambassador to Brazil in 1966, however, things began to change, at least a little; especially since the arrival of the new ambassador, John W. Tuthill, which would begin a process of reviewing the activities and massive presence of US government officials in the country. Thus, although the USA continued to be one of the main supporters of the regime, Tuthill's actions gradually gave rise to a more ambiguous image of the Brazilian reality in Washington.

The local situation was indeed complex since although it continued to execute an economic agenda aligned with the interests of large multinational capital, the country began to live under increasingly authoritarian measures, especially after the decree of the Institutional Act No. 5, of December 13, 1960, which, by suspending individual freedom, allowing political interventions of almost any nature and formalizing arrests and extra-judicial executions, put an end to almost the entirety of a still existing liberal state of law. It was in this context that the US State Department, on December 17 of the same year, sent a telegram to its diplomatic representations in Brazil, instructing them on what the understanding of the new political framework created by the decree of AI-5 should be. .  

Firstly, the telegram stated that the Brazilian framework would be tougher than that existing in other exceptional regimes in the hemisphere. Next, the document asks for information about the possibility that some actor could be both rational and influential enough to moderate the course of events, stating that it might be worth looking for them in civil society, especially in the press. and in the church.

The text of the telegram also asks about the regime's degree of unity and states that although Washington was not happy with the situation, demonstrations of such discontent should be done gently. In fact, echoing the optimism (cynical or sincere?) that Ambassador Gordon expressed to the North American Congress shortly after the Coup in order to justify support for the new regime, although starting in a critical tone, the telegram finally reaffirms his hope that things will soon return to the historical pattern of moderation typical of Brazilian politics. 

Thus, clearly demonstrating the recurring contradictions in North American foreign policy, the State Department decides that the bilateral relationship between countries should continue, especially in some strategic programs – including the continuation of foreign aid, even in the context of an increasingly authoritarian regime.   

Rafael R. Ioris, Ph.D. 

Professor of Latin American History and Politics

University of Denver