Document of the Week — The release of a parcel with “special political significance”

See the featured document of the week here! The release of a portion with “special political significance”

Check out the full document in our collection: John W. Tuthill Telegram to the U.S. Department of State on Reactions to Withdrawal of Financial Assistance

President Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964-1967) outside the Alvorada Palace: John Wills Tuthill, United States Ambassador to Brazil, hands over credentials to the president, Planalto Palace, Brasília, DF. – BR_RJANRIO_EH_0_FOT_PRP_08970

Throughout the year 1968, in Brazil, protests students, strikes and several street demonstrations emerged, highlighting dissatisfaction with the political scenario. The President Costa e Silva waved the decree of state of siege as a response to the demonstrations of students. At the same time, with the increase in repression, there were growing reports of torture and abuses. New actions by the armed left and mobilizations organized by civil society put pressure on the government, which responded aggressively and disproportionately in December 1968, with the decree of Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-5).

In this week's NACE CNV-Brazil document, dated January 6, 1969, the United States Ambassador to Brazil, John Tuthill, sends a telegram to the State Department in Washington listing and analyzing the possible reactions in Brazil to the postponement of a portion of the financial assistance North American, worth US$ 50 million, after the enactment of AI-5.

Given such a tense domestic scenario, Tuthill stated that the release of the portion had a “special political significance” and “strongly urged” that the decision be made in the broader context of the objectives and tactics of US policy towards Brazil. The timing of the granting should take into account a “delicate balance” between the risks of giving the impression of “complacency” regarding AI-5 or questioning the reliability of the US government.

He noted a “significant xenophobia latent among the military hardline”, who wanted to reduce the foreign presence in the country. If there was, according to Tuthill, the perception of cutting the economic aid, these actors could emerge stronger. This could make it difficult for ministers to act as Dolphin Netto (Farm) and Macedo Soares (Industry and Commerce) who recognized the importance of foreign investment for the development national. He considered, on the other hand, that a discreet stance by the United States government could serve to “strengthen” the Brazilians who were seeking to “induce” Costa e Silva towards a democratic opening.

He concluded by making it clear that it was not possible to “predict exactly when the installment” would be released for “optimal effect on the Brazilian government.” The Embassy, according to Tuthill, would continue to evaluate the matter on a daily basis, acknowledging that it would have to make a “definitive decision in the near future.” The Republican victory Richard Nixon in the presidential elections and Tuthill's departure from office a few days after sending this telegram would change the scenario of bilateral relations significantly.

— Prof. Dr. Gianfranco Caterina,

Researcher at NACE CNV-Brazil,

Postdoctoral fellow at the Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo

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