Document of the week! The presence of Americans in power disputes over the succession of Castello Branco

Check out the full document in our collection: Memorandum of conversation written by Frank C. Carlucci regarding Arthur da Costa e Silva's candidacy

The presence of Americans in power disputes over the succession of Castello Branco

The Americans had excellent penetration among members of the Brazilian military and political elites in the transition period between governments White Castle It is Costa e Silva. One of the most interesting aspects arising from this penetration was the observation, on the part of several Yankee interlocutors, that Castello Branco would not allow Costa e Silva to assume the presidency at the beginning of 1967.

This week's document deals with this aspect in a very interesting way. This is a “memorandum to file” – that is, a memo written by an employee of the US Embassy in River addressed to the Embassy archives – which reports conversations with two local politicians from the former state of Guanabara (Luiz Gonzaga da Gama Filho It is Paulo Ribeiro), with the former president of PTB (Luther Vargas) and with an intellectual (Cândido Mendes de Almeida) who had strong connections with the then head of the National Information Service, gen. Couto e Silva Golbery, about the Castello-Costa e Silva dispute on the eve of Costa e Silva delivering the ministry of war to fully assume the presidential candidacy.

All Yankee interlocutors defended the thesis that, once leaving the Ministry of War, Costa e Silva would be susceptible to a maneuver by Castello Branco to remove him from the position of favorite candidate for the presidency of the Republic. The logic behind this argument was that Castello, who had already been filling strategic Army posts with close allies, in particular the 2nd and 3rd Armies in São Paulo It is Rio Grande do Sul, respectively, would give the final card by placing someone of his deepest trust in the Ministry of War – which, in fact, he would do, with the appointment of General Ademar de Queiroz – in order to block Costa e Silva’s candidacy.

What draws attention is the certainty of the North American interlocutors that the above development would happen, and the coincidence of visions in this sense. On the other hand, the fact that local politicians in Guanabara belong to the MDB leaves the North Americans with a bit of a flea behind their ears, since, as the Yankee Embassy official himself states in the document, the only chance that the MDB had of placing someone in the presidency would be by dividing the forces of Castello and Costa e Silva , which would probably open space for a third way to gain strength in the indirect electoral process – in this case, supposedly someone with support from the MDB.

In the end, despite the certainty of the Yankee interlocutors, Castello would, yes, place someone he strictly trusted in the Ministry of War to replace Costa e Silva, but he would not make any move to prevent his former minister from becoming president. Costa e Silva would end up becoming the second general president of the Brazilian dictatorship. 

Prof. Dr. Felipe Loureiro,

Deputy coordinator of NACE CNV-Brazil,

Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo