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Following is a discussion of political, military and logistic considerations as they might apply to some of the situations which could develop in Brazil.

SITUATION 1Assumption

President Goulart has taken a clearly unconstitutional and/or illegal action.

The Armed Forces of Brazil have historically been the defenders of the Constitution and legal processes.

President Goulart has endeavored to fill a maximum of key military positions with his supporters; however, the conservative military elements still constitute the large bulk of the Armed Forces.

There is general appreciation within the Armed Forces of the "salami-slicing" method used by Goulart to weaken the influence and unity of the military. Considerable missionary work has been underway for some time by conservative military elements, particularly within the Army, to consolidate forces opposed to the current trend of the administration. It is believed that the senior conservative officers would immediately oppose an illegal or unconstitutional act by Goulart and would probably convince him to abdicate in favor of the next in line of succession.

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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This would probably be accomplished without the awareness of the general public and with merely the threat of force.

It is considered that the conservative army elements command sufficient strength and support to make an ultimatum effective.

SITUATION 2

Assumptions

1. A confederation of the States of São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul have seceded from the Federal Government and vowed to replace the Goulart Government with an economically sound, stabilized government, politically and economically aligned with the U. S. A.

2. The military and paramilitary forces have split their allegiance geographically, and those of the four southern states have pledged their full support to the confederation.

Facts

1. 100% of combat effective naval forces are under federal control.
2. 90% of combat effective air forces are under federal control.
3. There is a numerical parity of army forces, however, the best equipped and trained units are under federal control, including all paratroop units and its associated airlift and all MAP provided equipment.
4. Approximately 50-60 days' supply of POL is available in both areas.
5. An estimated 90% of all ammunition resources are under federal control.
6. Major sources of basic food supplies are under control of the confederacy.
7. The Rio area has stored meat reserves of two days and general food reserves of approximately 15 days.

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8. Major forces of confederacy are widely deployed throughout the states of the confederacy with minimum self-mobility.
9. All major federal Armed Forces are concentrated in the Rio area.
10. No all-weather or night fighter capability in either federal or confederate air forces.
11. Military communications of both forces are fixed stations and are vulnerable to overt or covert attack.
12. Land lines of communications are extremely vulnerable in all parts of the country.
13. A majority of major industry is under the control of the confederacy.

Discussion

The preponderance of military forces and resources are under the control of the federal forces. Additionally, the federal forces are concentrated in one area and are highly mobile whereas the confederate forces are widely dispersed and have a minimum of mobility. It must be assumed that intelligence will be available to both forces and any effort to reinforce the São Paulo garrisons, which would take several days, would immediately trigger an offensive by the federal forces. It is estimated that the key areas and the headquarters of the confederacy would fall to the federal forces not later than D plus two days. Within D plus two hours, air superiority would be established over the capital city of São Paulo and the headquarters of the confederacy. Within D plus four hours, the first vertical envelopment operation would be in progress with the major airfields as the targets. Within D plus eight hours, interdiction of the lines of communication would be underway denying confederate reinforcements for the area. D plus 24 hours would find naval units standing off all major port facilities denying confederate supply.

Within D plus five days, São Paulo and its environs would be completely under the control of the federal forces assuring sources of supply from there to the north.

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With the loss of the São Paulo area and its industrial complex, it is doubtful that the confederacy would continue to stand.

It is evident that to accomplish U.S. objectives, it would be necessary to provide sufficient military equipment and supplies to the confederacy to create a shift in the current balance of power.

It is also evident that the magnitude of the logistic support and equipment required to provide an advantage to the confederate forces would be impossible to furnish covertly and beyond the capacity of the confederate forces to utilize without additional training and technical resources.

Special operations designed at denying the federal forces the use of airfields, POL, or other major necessities would be deterrents and while delaying or diminishing the operations described above, it is considered that the federal forces would be able to act prior to adequate reinforcement of the confederate forces.

The Military Police of São Paulo numbering some 25,000 has been considered in this study. It is believed that their training and equipment is such that they would be unable to resist the well trained, well equipped, professional troops of the federal forces.

Conclusion

Under the assumptions and information upon which this study is based, it is concluded that it would not be possible for the United States to provide covertly sufficient logistic support or special operations to achieve its desired objectives.

As a result of the foregoing conclusion, it is considered that U.S. objectives can be achieved only with overt supporting action. The following discussion deals with the required mission and forces.

The following comments regarding overt assistance by the United States is predicated on the assumption that the U.S. will be privy to the detailed plans of the confederacy, and will be able to preposition certain military and naval elements. Timing will be the most important single factor and will mean the difference between an unopposed landing among friendly

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forces and an opposed landing with attendant establishment of beachheads, etc. With the short time element described earlier for the operations of federal forces, it is conceivable, with lack of close coordination, that U.S. forces could arrive after the fall of the confederacy. D minus 20 days will be required for preparation and preplacement of forces.

Prerequisite to the success of the operation are air superiority, control of harbors and port facilities and security of strategic areas. This will require that certain missions be performed:

Army. The mission of U.S. Army forces in the proposed operation would be to assist confederate army to defend the São Paulo industrial complex, assure uninterrupted U.S. utilization of airfields and port facilities at Santos, establish logistic support capability ashore for both U.S. and confederate forces, provide ground force tactical equipment and munitions, establish a training mission for confederate army.

Navy. All major combatant Brazilian Navy forces are normally based in Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara Bay, where the major fleet repair, upkeep and supply facilities are also located. Secondary Brazilian Navy base facilities are located in the north (in order of capability) at Belem, Recife, Natal and Salvador. No fleet units larger than patrol frigates are normally located at these northern bases. The mission of the U.S. Naval forces in the proposed operation will be "to establish and maintain control of all Brazilian coastal sealines of communications in order to use them to the confederacy advantage and to deny their use to the federal forces." The primary task to accomplish this mission would be to close the entrance of Guanabara Bay at the outset of hostilities keeping the major units of the Brazilian fleet inside.

Air Force. The U.S. Air Force's missions are to establish and maintain air superiority, perform such interdictions and intruder missions as are beyond the capability of the confederacy, provide airlift of priority supporting supplies, provide air mobility of friendly forces for concentration of force at critical points, perform surveillance coastal patrol, and perform tactical reconnaissance.

U.S. forces required to accomplish the foregoing are:

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- Army. 91 Special Forces Company
 91 Airborne Brigade - STRIGOM Support
 91 Infantry Brigade - Naval Support
 1 Aviation Light Transportation Company -
 Naval Support
 1 MASH - Naval Support
 1 Combat Engineer Battalion - Naval Support
 1 Modified Log Command, Type A
- ? Provide initial training mission functions.
 Follow-up
 1 Infantry Brigade
- Navy. 1 Attack Carrier (with Carrier Air Group embarked)
 1 Helicopter Carrier (with Army Aviation Transport
 Company, light, embarked)
 6 Destroyers
 1 Command Ship (for communications, primarily)
 1 Fleet Oiler
 1 Tanker (with JP-4 for land based air forces)
 1 Destroyer Tender
 6 APA assault shipping - Army requirement
 4 AKA assault shipping - Army requirement
 8-10 LST assault shipping - Army requirement
- Air Force. 2 Squadrons of F-105
 1 Squadron of B-66
 1 Squadron of RF-101 (composite)
 3 Troop Carrier Squadrons
 1 Aerial Refueling Squadron
 1 Carrier Air Group embarked
 1 Tactical control element
 Miscellaneous maintenance, supply and
 support units

The foregoing missions are designed to nullify the capacity of the federal forces to put down the confederacy. No consideration has been given to offensive actions to overthrow the Federal Government or to the length of time it will be necessary to "occupy" the southern area. The confederacy army forces could be furnished training and equipment eventually to enable them to be self-sufficient, however, naval and air forces would have to remain in place as long as the unstable situation prevails.

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It is reiterated that the above estimates are based on moving in place consistent with the secession announcement and prior to action by federal forces, requiring coordinated timing between confederacy and U.S. representatives. A time difference between the secession announcement and moving in of U.S. forces will require additional force in direct proportion to the depth to which federal forces are in place in confederacy territory.

SITUATION 3

A situation is foreseen wherein opposition materializes against actions taken by the Federal Government that are deemed illegal or unconstitutional. Such a situation could be generated by a number of events among which are the assassination or detention of an important state governor or federal intervention of a state government for political reasons.

The possible success of the Federal Government in its efforts to eliminate the major opponents to the establishment of a leftist aligned regime hostile to the United States would be inimical to our national interests.

In the following discussion of the possible sequence of events, it should be emphasized that it is based on the current situation and is subject to variations due to changing events which would affect the character and the degree of U.S. action and assistance.

It is estimated that the federal Army forces will be composed of the 1st Army in the Rio area, though it is estimated some units would be wracked with dissension and disagreement as to the measure of support to be given to the Federal Government. This could involve actual fighting between some of these units though the differences would more probably take the form of demonstrations of force and threats.

This dissension will limit the 1st Army's ability to move successfully against peripheral forces in a state of rebellion (Juiz de Fora, Petropolis, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo). The Rio airports and the harbor would be in the hands of those loyal to the Federal Government. Niterói and the surrounding areas in the State of Rio would also presumably be loyal to the Federal Government. These forces would be subject to the same state of dissension as would be the case with the 1st Army in Rio, but it is believed that the major forces would join in opposition to the Federal Government. The Força Pública and Guarda Civil would also be aligned with the forces opposing the Federal Government.

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In Minas Gerais, the probability is that the State Military Police, some 14,000 in number, would persuade the federal garrisons in Belo Horizonte and Juiz de Fora to join them in opposition to the Federal Government. The situation in other garrison areas in Brazil would be unclear.

The Navy would probably alert all its vessels, defend the Naval Arsenal and assume a "wait and see" attitude.

Air Force units in the 3rd Air Zone (Rio de Janeiro area) could be expected to remain loyal to the Federal Government but might be hampered in their operations by acts of sabotage.

All Brazilian Air Force units, whichever side they are aligned with, would be vulnerable to sabotage; units and air fields could suffer serious operational limitations as a result of such actions.

Forces in the State of Guanabara opposed to the federal action would consist in the main of the militia which it is estimated would remain loyal to Lacerda. This force numbers approximately 10,000; however, the level of training and equipment is low and it would not be expected to resist for any length of time. It is assumed that Lacerda has additional civil support and an undeterminate supply of small arms. This force would be able to offer only token resistance.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which the Brazilian Armed Forces would be affected by circumstances which confused the issues of constitutional duties and ideological beliefs. However, it is considered that less than 50 percent of the Army personnel, relatively none of the Navy and initially 70 percent of the Air Force will participate effectively in offensive action against another Brazilian, and these figures would probably diminish rapidly if no active combat took place or if no casualties occurred.

Accordingly, it would be difficult for the federal forces to organize and launch an offensive action against the opposing forces in São Paulo. Delays caused by dissension and associated problems would provide sufficient time for interdiction of land lines of communications and defense of critical bases and areas. Disruption of communications would, within a few days, have a significant effect on food supplies to the Rio area. It is possible that under such conditions influential and conservative military

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leaders would be able to consolidate a majority of the Armed Forces in an effort to mediate and restore peace and order. Such an action would probably result in a temporary military takeover. The possibility exists that Air Force units directed by leaders loyal to the government would take action against the relatively unprotected key air bases of São Paulo. Such action, if bloodshed resulted, could result in inflammatory reprisals and an entirely different picture.

With the exception of small arms, communications and riot control material, there is relatively little military equipment which can be utilized without technical training; therefore, U.S. assistance, other than U.S. troops, would probably be limited to small arms and logistic support.

Covert aid to friendly forces could be afforded only by air or sea. If by air, it would require air fields at the destinations securely held and remote from observation with satisfactory onward transportation from the point of arrival. Due to the types of aircraft that would have to be used and the necessity for intermediate staging or refueling stops, it would be practically impossible to maintain the covert nature of this assistance, and in any case it would be only on a very limited scale. By sea, covert assistance would be more simple but prior planning would be essential because of the time factors involved. Ships could be preloaded with materiel and munitions and there could be some pre-positioning of tankers close to Brazil at the time of the expected outbreak of hostilities. However, this would require a lead time of at least 20 days. At the same time the arrangements for this type of covert assistance would be subject to the maximum degree of premature exposure and the resulting adverse reactions both in and outside of Brazil.

Overt assistance would presuppose a request by friendly forces and the manifestation of support by the United States, while it would give rise to adverse reactions among chauvinistic elements, would have the advantage of rallying to the friendly forces considerable support from groups whose principal motivation would be a desire to be on the winning side.

Open assistance by air would require use of transport aircraft in considerable numbers with some escort. Intermediate refueling points, such as Belem or Salvador, would be essential and would probably be available. These refueling points would have to be resupplied by sea and available stocks of POL at these points would be the controlling factor in the

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earlier stages of airborne assistance. The points of destination would have to be securely held. Following a policy decision by the U.S., overt assistance by air could be rendered within 24 hours if USCINCSO and STRAC equipment and stocks could be made available.

Open assistance by sea: The ports most likely to be held by forces friendly to the U.S. would be Belem, Salvador, Vitoria, Santos and Paranaguá. Across the beach delivery would also be undertaken at Praia Grande south of Santos where a newly completed highway leads to São Paulo avoiding the city of Santos.

Openly declared U.S. support for the resistance forces would have a strong influence on the Brazilian Navy and it might well lead to abandoning a "wait and see" attitude and throwing their support to the resistance forces. If this should come about, it would simplify the problem of the use of Brazilian ports and merchant vessels.

The foregoing comments as to the feasibility of covert or overt supply of small arms, communications equipment and logistic support is not to be taken as a prediction that this is the only type of assistance required to assure victory for the friendly forces.

Should the situation develop into heated combat, the preponderance of strength in the short run lies with the federal forces which are better trained, organized and equipped than the opposing troops. Small arms, ammunition and supplies will not significantly affect the balance.

U.S. units will be required in sufficient force to insure results favorable to the forces favorable to the U.S. national interests. The magnitude and composition of these forces would be on the order of the forces described in "Situation 2".

Over a longer period of time, logistics would be a decisive factor since neither of the forces involved can sustain combat operation for more than an estimated 30 to 45 days without outside support.

At an early moment in the development of a situation as described in paragraph one of this section a clear indication of support by the United States would have a very significant and possibly a decisive weakening effect on the composition and effectiveness of the federal forces. It is

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recognized that such a U.S. declaration would elicit charges of intervention from a certain portion of the neutral elements and would have a certain crystalizing effect on the hard core leftist inspired and chauvanistic federal supporters. However it is considered that the major reaction to declared U.S. support would have overriding benefits and could take much of the heart out of the federal forces. Brazilians, perhaps more than most people, like to be on the winning side and U.S. support would appear to guarantee success.

Of equal or more importance, it is believed that early manifestation of U.S. determination to assist democratically aligned forces would have a deterrent effect on the rendering of overt or covert assistance by communist powers.

It should also be noted that in any such conflict U.S. provided military assistance equipment will be used by the federal forces. MAP equipment is by far the most modern and effective offensive equipment in the Brazilian Armed Forces, and could, if the situation deteriorated into heated combat, be the advantage necessary to insure a quick downfall of the friendly forces. In the light of the present discussion in the U.S. Congress and press with regard to Latin America, critical of the ousting of governments by force or coup d' etat, and of the misuse of U.S. military assistance in civil or national differences, may make it difficult to rally understanding and support of U.S. intercession in the Brazilian picture. Nevertheless, it appears that U.S. support, both moral and material, may mean the difference between the establishment of a democratic, Western oriented Brazilian government or the strengthening and solidification of a clearly leftist oriented group.

LOGISTICS

(The following is a summary of some of the controlling considerations affecting a few key factors, i. e., air and sea transportation, POL supply and food stocks, in the situations discussed in the basic situations.)

Transport

Logistic support may be accomplished either by air or by sea.

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Air. Air transport, although much the more rapid of the two, is limited in unit capacity, range, special facilities required for operation and is more susceptible to observation. C-135 jet transport aircraft can deliver a payload of approximately 50,000 pounds from Surinam to São Paulo and return to Surinam without refueling. Since MATS aircraft stage normally through Surinam, this could appear to be a normal operation, however landing operations would be limited to Viracopos in the São Paulo area. Utilizing C-130 type aircraft with considerably less range, it would be possible to fly directly from Panama to São Paulo, however it would be necessary to refuel for the return trip. This could be accomplished at Asuncion, Paraguay if no fuel were available at São Paulo. This aircraft can deliver a payload of approximately 30,000 pounds and has the added facility of being able to land at a number of air fields in the São Paulo area.

Type aircraft	C-130	C-135B (jet)
Payload	30,000	50,000
T/O ground run	4,500 ft	7,200 ft
Landing ground roll	2,500 "	2,890 "
Max range	3,800 NM	4,260 NM
Speed 310 NM/HR	310 NM/HR	450 NM/HR

Distances by most direct route:

Panama	-	São Paulo	2,900 nautical miles
Panama	-	Asuncion	2,700 " "
Panama	-	Surinam	1,500 " "
Panama	-	Belem	2,300 " "
Surinam	-	Belem	590 " "
Surinam	-	São Paulo	2,000 " "
São Paulo	-	Asuncion	880 " "

<u>Airport</u>		<u>Runway length</u>
São Paulo	Viracopos	10,600 ft
São Paulo	Cumbica	6,400 "
São Paulo	Congonhas	6,200 "
São Paulo	Marte	5,250 "
Belem	Val de Cães	5,950 "
P. Alegre	Sal. Filho	6,550 "
P. Alegre	Gravatá	6,550 "

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Sea. Logistic support by surface vessel would facilitate a covert operation and would permit the greater part of initial military support (other than fuel) to be delivered in one shipment. The disadvantage is the time element which would require advance information for procurement, loading and pre-positioning.

Transport. FRONAPE (Petrobras tanker fleet) consists of 20 tankers engaged in international shipping. The seven largest of these tankers are in the 32-35 thousand ton capacity with a speed of 16-17 knots. The capacity of this fleet is approximately nine million metric tons. Additional capacity of about one million tons is normally under charter to Petrobras.

The U.S. Navy has six tankers of 38-40 thousand ton capacity and 34 tankers with a 23-26 thousand ton capacity. Speed ranges from 16 to 20 knots.

Sources of crude oil. In 1962 Brazil imported approximately 74 million barrels of crude. Major suppliers were:

Venezuela	38	million	barrels
Saudi Arabia	23	"	"
Kuwait	10	"	"
USSR	1.5	"	"
Netherlands West Indies	0.8	"	"
Peru	0.8	"	"

Crude imports represent about two-thirds of Brazil's total crude requirements.

Refining Capacity

The following table demonstrates Brazil's refining capacity, per calendar day, by refinery and location. Refineries normally run at near capacity.

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<u>Refinery</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity</u>
Cubatão (Petrobras)	São Paulo	110,000
Mataripe (Petrobras)	Bahia	42,000
Capuava (Private)	São Paulo	30,000
Manguinhos (Private)	Guanabara	10,000
Copam (Private)	Manaus	5,000
Duque de Caxias (Petrobras)	Rio de Janeiro	90,000
Ipiranga (Private)	Rio Grande do Sul	9,000
Total		296,500

Storage Capacity, Consumption and Inventory Levels at Main

Terminals

Unit: '000 bbls.

<u>PRODUCTS</u>	<u>TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY(?)</u>	<u>YEARLY CONSUMP- TION</u>	<u>INVENTORY (inc. in transit)</u>	
			<u>LEVELS</u>	<u>M/BBLs. DAYS</u>
<u>Gasolines</u>				
Belém	86	348	26	29
Recife	145	1178	48	15
Bahia (?)	442	1404	32	8
Rio (??)	677	6543	125	7(b)
Santos/S. Paulo(???)	710	14914	245	6(b)
R. Gde./P. Alegre	353	3390	93	10(b)
TOTAL	2413	27777 (1)	569	8

Kerosene

Belém	109	187	15	29
Recife	80	319	14	15
Bahia (?)	194	539	13	8
Rio (??)	217	820	33	15(b)
Santos/S. Paulo (???)	123	899	37	15(b)
R. Gde./P. Alegre	64	351	10	10
TOTAL	787	3115 (2)	122	14

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Unit: '000 bbls.

<u>PRODUCTS</u>	<u>TOTAL STORAGE CAPACITY(?)</u>	<u>YEARLY CONSUMP- TION</u>	<u>INVENTORY (inc. in LEVELS transit)</u>	
			<u>M/BBLs.</u>	<u>DAYS</u>
<u>Distillates (Diesel)</u>				
Belém	124	378	29	29
Recife	137	653	27	15
Bahia (?)	204	1143	25	8
Rio (??)	693	5608	123	8(b)
Santos/S. Paulo (???)	738	9814	192	7(b)
R. Gde./P. Alegre	294	2426	66	10
TOTAL	2190	20022 (3)	462	8
<u>Avgas</u>				
Belém	86	147	24	60
Recife	105	187	30	60
Bahia	36	133	24	60
Rio	212	412	66	60
Santos/S. Paulo	133	433	72	60
R. Gde./P. Alegre	26	78	12	60
TOTAL	598	1390 (4)	228	60
<u>Jet Fuel</u>				
Belém	18	30	5	50
Recife	26	189	25	50
Bahia	12	33	5	50
Rio	158	1040	140	50
Santos/S. Paulo	89	370	50	50
R. Gde./P. Alegre	39	129	20	50
TOTAL	342	1791 (5)	245	50

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Unit: '000 bbls.

<u>PRODUCTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>YEARLY</u>	<u>INVENTORY</u>	<u>(inc. in</u>
	<u>STORAGE</u>	<u>CONSUMP-</u>	<u>LEVELS</u>	<u>transit)</u>
	<u>CAPACITY(?)</u>	<u>TION</u>	<u>M/BBLS.</u>	<u>DAYS</u>
<u>Fuel Oil</u>				
Belém	76	514	58	41
Recife	1 82	1359	70	19
Bahia (?)	5 27	1043	45	16
Rio (??)	8 36	111 21	228	7(b)
Santos/S. Paulo (???)	72 4	18615	560	11(b)
R. Gde./P. Alegre	246	2201	70	12
TOTAL	2591	34853 (6)	1031	11

NOTE: a) To arrive at useable storage capacity, subtract 5%.

b) In addition to terminal and in transit inventories, inventories exist in the interior of the country, principally in Rio and São Paulo areas. These inventories may be estimated as follows, in terms of the area requirements:

	<u>Gasol</u>	<u>Kero</u>	<u>Diesel</u>	<u>Fuel</u>
Rio (excl. Gramacho) M/Bbls.	50	13	46	39
Days	3	6	3	1
S. Paulo (excl. Pipeline) M/Bbls.	242	11	100	15
Days	6	5	4	-

The above totals represent the following of Brazil consumption:

- | | |
|-----------|-----------|
| (1) 79.9% | (4) 83.6% |
| (2) 74.8% | (5) 95.4% |
| (3) 82.5% | (6) 94.9% |

- (?) Incl. Madre de Deus storage capacity
(??) Incl. Ilha d'Água/Gramacho storage capacity
(???) Incl. Santos/S. Paulo Pipeline storage capacity

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Current Supply Picture - National and Caribbean

		Unit: '000 Bbls.		
<u>PRODUCTS</u>	<u>YEARLY CONSUMPTION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>ROUND</u>	<u>T-2 (\$)</u>
			<u>TRIP</u>	<u>EQUIVALENTS</u>
<u>Clean Products</u>				
Belém	913	Copam	8	0.3
Recife	2150	Mataripe	6	0.2
Bahia	3086	Mataripe	3	0.2
Rio	1 2971	Caxias/Mang.	-	-
Santos/S. Paulo	25627	Cap./Cubatão	-	-
R. Gde./P. Alegre	6167	Caxias/Ipiranga	8	1.7
TOTAL	50914			2.4
<u>Dirty Products</u>				
Recife/Belém	1873	Caxias	19	1.2
Bahia	1043	Caxias	7	0.2
Rio/R. Grande	13322	Mat./Cax./Mang./Ip.	12	1.4
Santos/S. Paulo	18615	Cap./Cubatão	-	-
TOTAL	34853			2.8
<u>Avgas/Jet Fuel</u>				
Recife/Bahia/ Belém	719	Caribbean	37	1.0
Rio (§§)	1659	Caribbean	29	1.2
Santos	803	Caribbean	31	0.6
TOTAL	3181			2.8

(§) 90% efficiency factor

(§§) Incl. Rio Grande supplied coastwise

Based on normal consumption data, the following is an estimate of Brazil's annual finished petroleum products requirements and of the time and tanker volume involved in supplying Brazil's major terminals should use of national refineries be denied and Brazil's needs were furnished from the Caribbean area.

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Supply Picture Ex-Caribbean

<u>PRODUCTS</u>	<u>YEARLY CONSUMP- TION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	Unit: '000 Bbls.	
			<u>ROUND TRIP</u>	<u>T-2 (\$) EQUIVALENTS</u>
<u>Clean Products (\$\$)</u>				
Recife/Belém	3616	Caribbean	33	3.4
Bahia	3252	Caribbean	27	2.1
Rio	14423	Caribbean	31	10.8
Santos/R. Grande	32804	Caribbean	37	31.6
TOTAL	54095			47.9

Dirty Products

Recife/Belém	1873	Caribbean	33	2.1
Bahia	1043	Caribbean	27	0.9
Rio	11121	Caribbean	31	10.4
Santos/R. Grande	20816	Caribbean	37	21.2
TOTAL	34853			34.6

(\$\$) 90% efficiency factor

(\$\$) Incl. Avgas/Jet Fuel

Food

The bulk of the food supply for the Rio de Janeiro area comes from São Paulo and Minas. The interdiction of transportation between São Paulo and Rio, or of the one road from Belo Horizonte to Rio de Janeiro, would cause a meat shortage in Rio within two days and an absolute civilian food shortage in two weeks.

The Brazilian Army has a 30 day supply of rations and interdiction of supply routes would not directly affect them for that period of time.

The following table represents the bare minimum daily requirements for Rio and São Paulo. This is calculated on the basis of one-half daily

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normal requirements. There, of course, could be shifts from one item to another, depending on availability, i. e., substitution of rice for potatoes, etc.

Bare Minimum Total Daily Requirements
of Food for Rio and São Paulo

Rio - 3.5 million people
São Paulo - 4.5 million people

Product	Quantity in Short Tons		Calories per day/per cap.
	Rio	São Paulo	
Wheat	141	181	132
Corn	158	203	148
Rice	200	258	185
Sugar	195	250	145
Potatoes	158	203	35
Manioc	812	1,044	230
Pulses	118	151	105
Vegetables	74	94	5
Bananas	333	428	60
Other Fruit	179	231	25
Meat	184	237	120
Whole Milk	235	302	37
Butter	4	5	8
Slaughter Fats	25	32	60
Vegetable Oils	15	19	35
TOTALS	2,831	3,638	1,330

Figures for all existing food stocks are incomplete, however the figures for the staple items listed below are believed to be representative of the situation for other items.

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Food Stocks

Rio de Janeiro:

Rice	8,918 short tons
Beans	4,324 " "
Wheat	--- (estimated 15 days normal supply)
Meat	660 - 1,000 short tons

São Paulo:

Rice	5,578 short tons
Beans	1,785 " "
Corn	99,206 " "
Meat	8,000 " "

Mass Media

While no complete study has been made of the mass media facilities available to the various factions, or of newsprint stocks and supplies, the salient facts regarding radio broadcasting are: Most radio broadcasting is long wave and reaches only a purely local audience. Most, if not all, of the local stations are equipped to rebroadcast short-wave programs. It is estimated that there are 7,500,000 radio receivers in Brazil of which 40 percent or 3 million are equipped to receive short-wave programs.

Brazilian short-wave broadcast facilities are concentrated in Rio and São Paulo. Radio Nacional in Rio and Radio Tupi in São Paulo have the strongest signals. There are no short-wave broadcast facilities in Curitiba, Porto Alegre or Pernambuco.

Short-wave Broadcasting Stations

Rio de Janeiro

RADIO CONTINENTAL	- 6,195 Kcs., 10 KW
RADIO GLOBO	- 6,035 Kcs., 7.5 KW
RADIO MAYRINK VEIGA	- 9,575 Kcs., 10 KW
RADIO MAUÁ	- 9,705 Kcs., 10 KW

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
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RADIO RURAL	- 15,105 Kcs.
RADIO TAMOIO	- 6,200 Kcs., 100 KW
RADIO NACIONAL	- PRL-7 9,720 (50)
	PRL-8 15,295 (50)
	PRL-9 6,145 (10); 17,850 (10)

São Paulo

RADIO BANDEIRANTES	- 6,185 Kcs., 10 KW
RADIO DIFUSORA	- 11,765 Kcs.
RADIO GAZETA	- 15,325 Kcs., 7.5 KW
RADIO RECORD	- 11,965 Kcs., 7.5 KW
RADIO TUPI	- 11,755 Kcs., 25 KW



Lincoln Gordon
American Ambassador

cc Gen. O'Meara CINCSO

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