

# TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the  
United States of America

BRAXILIA

**SUBJECT**

ACTION  
POL-2  
INFO  
FILES  
RF

SECRET

Classification

Control: 0920

Recd: 31MAY67

P 280115Z MAY 67 ZFF-3  
FM USCINCSO  
TO RUEPJS/JCS  
INFO RUEPJS/DOD/ISA  
RUEHC/SECSTATE  
RUESVA/AMEMB RIO DO JANEIRO  
RULPBZ/COMUSMILGP BRAZIL  
BT

SECRET SC3202A

STATE FOR STATE AND ALSO PLEASE PASS CY TO AMB TUTHILL IN WASH DC

1. VISITED MANAUS, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, SALVADOR (BAHIA) AND RECIFE 21-27 MAY. HAD USEFUL TALKS WITH AMBASSADOR TUTHILL AND MEMBERS HIS STAFF AND ALL ELEMENTS MILGP. ON BRAZILIAN SIDE, SAW PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA BRIEFLY IN BRASILIA AND EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH NAVY MINISTER RADEMAKER, ARMY MINISTER LYRA TAVARES, AIR MINISTER MARCIO, VARIOUS COMMANDERS AND LEADERS INCLUDING COMMANDANT ARMY STAFF COLLEGE, ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF OF ARMY, COMMANDANT NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, COMMANDERS 2ND, 3RD AND 4TH NAVAL DISTRICTS, 6TH AND 7TH MILITARY REGIONS AND ACTING COMMANDER 4TH ARMY. HAD ONE HOUR WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO 24 MAY IN COMPANY AMAMB, AND HAD INTERESTING TALK WITH AMB GURGEL VALENTE, NEW CHIEF OF AMERICAN SECTION FOREIGN MINISTRY (IN CHARGE OF RELATIONS WITH REST OF LATIN AMERICA AND WITH UNITED STATES).

2. THERE IS A GENERAL IMPRESSION OF OPTINISM AS CONSEQUENCE SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM CASTELLO BRANCO'S TO NEW GOVERNMENT AND FEELING LATTER WILL TEMPER AUSTERITY PROGRAM TO PERMIT GRADUAL RETURN TO FREER POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND EXPANSION ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WHILE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DEPARTING FROM AIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF 1964 REVOLUTION. HOWEVER, THERE IS BY NO MEANS A CONCENCUS THAT ALL IS ROSY. APPREHENSIONS FLOW FROM UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER NEW GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT OR PERMIT LIBERALIZATION, FOR EXAMPLE IN STUDENT PROTEST AND FISCAL POLICY FIELD WHILE AT THE SAME TIME HEWING TO THE FIRM LINE OF THE REVOLUTION.

3. COSTA E SILVA IS SAID TO BE MUCH MORE CONCERNED WITH BEING "POPULAR" THAN HIS PREDECESSOR AND DETERMINED TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF "DEMOCRACY" BOTH WITH RESPECT TO HIMSELF AND HIS GOVERNMENT. A BIG QUESTION IS WHAT WILL BE THE THRUST OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, AS PART OF ITS WAY OF ACHEIVING "POPULARITY", WOULD PERHAPS STRIVE TO STRIKE A MORE "INDEPENDENT" (OF THE US) FOREIGN POLICY POSE. THIS DOES NOT NOR

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SHOULD IT NECESSARILY TROUBLE OUR PEOPLE IN BRAZIL UNDULY. WHAT DOES WORRY THEM, HOWEVER, IS THAT AN "INDEPENDENT" DIRECTION COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD BRAZIL TOO FAR AWAY FROM THE US IN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES OF VITAL CONCERN TO OUR COUNTRY SUCH AS WITH RESPECT TO CUBA AND VIETNAM. THERE IS SOME FEAT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, EITHER FROM A FRAME OF MIND ALLEGED TO STEM FROM A POSSIBLE FASCINATION WITH DEGAULLISM OR DRIVEN BY POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM, MIGHT LEAD BRAZIL DANGEROUSLY FAR FROM THE UNITED STATES. MAGALHAES PINTIZ SHOWS A CERTAIN RETICENCE TO TALK LIKE AN ALLY AND IS REPORTED TO HAVE MADE A POINT TO THE BRAZILIAN CONGRESS (OR A GROUP OF CONGRESSMEN) THAT BRAZIL WOULD FOLLOW A POLICY OF "NON-INVOLVEMENT" IN VIETNAM. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT BRAZIL WAS NOW MORE "NEUTRAL".

4. PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA HIMSELF IS BELIEVED TO BE FIRMLY WITH US. HE SPONTANEOUSLY EXPRESSED THIS SOLIDARITY ABOUT VIETNAM WHILE TALKING RECENTLY WITH RICHARD NIXON AND THE AMBASSADOR. IT IS UNCERTAIN AT WHAT POINT COSTA E SILVA, HIMSELF ANXIOUS TO ACHIEVE "POPULARITY" AND "DEMOCRACY" AND PREOCCUPIED WITH MANY INTERNAL PROBLEMS MIGHT RESTRAIN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD THE LATTER TRAVEL TOO FAR ALONG THE "NEUTRALITY" ROAD.

5. THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY ARE KNOWN TO BE WORRIED BY THE LITTLE CLOUDS OF "NEUTRALITY" ON THE HORIZON. PERHAPS AS A MANIFESTATION OF THIS CONCERN AND TO REASSURE THE UNITED STATES THAT THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY AT LEAST ARE ON OUR SIDE, ACTING 4TH ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL OTAVIO, DURING MY VISIT TO HIS HEADQUARTERS 26 MAY, ELOQUENTLY AND SOMEWHAT EMOTIONALLY, IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS OFFICERS AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING OUR CONSUL GENERAL, PAID TRIBUTE TO OUR FIGHT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AGAINST WHAT HE TERMED OUR COMMON COMMUNIST ENEMY.

6. IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT, AT THIS JUNCTURE OF HISTORY, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE VERY BADLY ADVISED NOT TO PONDER CAREFULLY AND NOT TO DELIBERATELY CULTIVATE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY. IT IS A RELATIONSHIP THAT TO QUOTE GENERAL OTAVIO, STEMS FROM A COMMON COMMITMENT TO "LIBERTY, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY". IT ALSO STEMS FROM A COMMON DISGUST FOR ATHEISTIC COMMUNISM; AND IT IS A RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS BEEN CULTIVATED BY LONG-STANDING TIES OF MILITARY COOPERATION EXEMPLIFIED BY OUR ARMED FORCES' MISSIONS, OUR TRAINING SCHOLARSHIPS AND JOINT UNDERTAKINGS SUCH AS WORLD WAR II AND SANTO DOMINGO. THIS AVOWEDLY PRO-WESTERN, PROFESSIONAL AND DISCIPLINED FORCE IS THE BEST GUARANTOR NOT ONLY OF PUBLIC ORDER AND STABILITY IN BRAZIL BUT OF A

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CONTINUED PRO-DEMOCRATIC AND PRO-US ORIENTATION OF THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT. THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IS THE FINAL POLITICAL ARBITER IN BRAZIL AND WILL HAVE A DOMINANT POSITION FOR YEARS TO COME. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO TAKE SPECIAL PAINS TO PROTECT AND NOURISH OUR TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP WITH THIS FORCE. WE NEVER KNOW WHEN WE MAY NEED ITS SUPPORT IN AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT MATTER SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO INCLINE FOREIGN POLICY ACTION IN A US DIRECTION OR TO PULL OUR CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE IN A FUTURE SITUATION LIKE THE DOMINIC

N REPUBLIC. AS I IMPRESSED ON OUR MILGP OFFICERS ON THIS VISIT AND HAVE EMPHASIZED TO MY STAFF AND COMMANDERS WE MUST TAKE SPECIAL PAINS TO CULTIVATE AND ORIENT THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO WILL BE CALLING THE SIGNALS IN TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS. THE SENIOR OFFICERS, INTIMATELY AND EMOTIONALLY ATTACHED TO THE US AS A CONSEQUENCE OF WORLD WAR II ARE ALMOST ALL RETIRED. THE BRAZILIAN DOMREP CONTRIBUTION WAS TOO SMALL TO ASSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE TRADITIONAL WARM RELATIONSHIPS.

7. I SENSED DURING THIS VISIT FOR THE FIRST TIME A POSSIBLE BEGINNING OF THE EROSION OF THIS WARM FEELING ON THE PART OF SEVERAL KEY MILITARY OFFICIALS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE CERTAIN OF THE EXTENT OF THIS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE. HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS MY IMPRESSIONS DURING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON 6-8 JUNE.

8. I URGE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF OUR POLICY AND STRATEGY TOWARDS THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. I RECOMMEND THAT WE ADOPT A POSITIVE AND HELPFUL ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT NOT ONLY TO BRAZILIAN MILITARY EFFORTS TO MAIN PROFESSIONAL FORCES BUT TO THIER UNALTERABLE DETERMINATION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIR LEGITIMATE MILITARY NEED TO EFFECT A MODICUM OF MODERNIZATION. OTHERWISE WE SHALL RISK LOSING A MOST IMPORTANT ASSET TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

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