

ARA Mr. Loya

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By DF/AE NARA, Date 6/29/23

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

April 8, 1968

SUBJECT: Policy Planning Talks

PARTICIPANTS: Counselor Ronald Small, Ministry of Foreign Relations
Minister Raulo Elyrio Saraiva Guerreiro, Ministry
of Foreign Relations
Conselheiro Paulo Nogueira Batista, Assistant Secretary
General for Political Planning, Ministry of Foreign Relations
Minister William Belton, Deputy Chief of Mission,
American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro
Mr. Frank Carlucci, Executive Officer, American Embassy,
Rio de Janeiro
Mr. Jack B. Kubisch, Country Director for Brazilian
Affairs, Department of State

PLACE & DATE: Minister Belton's Residence, April 4, 1968

In the course of our general group discussion on a wide range of subjects during and following this informal luncheon, I turned to the Foreign Ministry Assistant Secretary General for Political Planning, Paulo Nogueira Batista, whom I have known well for many years, and raised the subject of the policy planning talks. This was a semi-private discussion between the two of us while the others present continued their discussion of other matters.

I summarized for Paulo the discussion that Ambassador Futhill, Minister Belton, and I had had the previous day with the new Secretary General of the Foreign Office, Ambassador Mario Gibson Barbosa. Paulo said he had also discussed the subject with Gibson, although they had reached no definite decision yet as to whether they wanted to go ahead with the original plan to have the talks in Brazil or whether they would accept the invitation to have the next round of talks again in or near Washington. Paulo said he saw advantages both ways. He said Itamaraty did not want to give the impression to Mr. Henry Owen and other Americans that they were unwilling for any reason to have the U.S. group come to Brazil. I reassured him on this point and told him that, in my opinion, we would be perfectly prepared to have the talks in either place at a mutually convenient time.

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At my initiative, we then turned to a short discussion of possible agenda items for the talks. Paulo indicated his view that the talks should probably follow about the same scope of subjects that were covered last year. I then told him that there had been some informal discussion on our side about the possibility of tacking on a day or so of special talks at the end of the regular policy planning schedule of meetings for each of two subjects: general AID and economic development matters, and politico-security matters. I said that we did not yet have a U.S. Government position on these matters but that I thought there was a possibility we might suggest one or both of these subjects to the Brazilians for inclusion in the talks. If so, we would want to bring into the talks one or two experts in the field to be discussed. For example, for the AID and economic development talks, we would probably want to include several AID officials, and for the politico-security talks some civilian officials from the Department of Defense.

There followed a somewhat more detailed discussion between us, joined by Mr. Carlucci, about what I meant by politico-security talks as distinguished from "military" talks. We also discussed who on the Brazilian side might join the Foreign Office officials for these talks if it was decided to hold them.

It was obvious that Paulo was less than enthusiastic about the prospect of politico-security talks. He speculated with us about various possibilities on the Brazilian side for Brazilian officials to deal with the kinds of questions that would come up in these talks. In every case, whether talking about the Ministries of War, Navy, and Air, or of the National Security Council, the Superior War College, or the General Staff of the Armed Forces, he had difficulty, even after consulting with his two Brazilian colleagues present at the luncheon, who began to join in the discussion, in coming up with any Brazilian officials who were not military officers. The Brazilian civilians who were attached in some way or other to any of these organizations were simply too low-ranking and not well enough informed to be able to make any significant contribution to talks on politico-security subjects.

Accordingly, Paulo seemed to be concluding that the Brazilian representatives for such talks would have to come from the Foreign Office and, given some of the inter-departmental rivalries that exist in the Brazilian Government at the present time--the Foreign Ministry is not warmly regarded in official Brazilian military circles--the prospects were not bright for useful discussions between Brazilians and Americans in the overall context of these policy planning talks.

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He said he was going to give the matter further thought, however, and to discuss it with Gibson so that Brazilian thinking would be well advanced in the event the U.S. decided to propose such talks.

April 3, 1968

SUBJECT: Policy Planning Talks

REFERENCE: Ambassador Mario Gibson, Secretary General
for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador John H. Belmont, Assistant Secretary, Rio de Janeiro

Minister Belton, Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro

ARA/BR:JBKubisch:cs
Ambassador John H. Belmont, Secretary General for State

cc: The Ambassador

Minister Belton, Secretary of Foreign Relations, Rio de Janeiro, April 3, 1968

Mr. Carlucci

ARA: Mr. Sayre

S/P: Mr. Owen

In addition to two other subjects reported separately by telegram to Washington, Ambassador Tuthill raised the subject of the next round of policy planning talks.

We inquired as to Gibson's preferences regarding dates and location of the policy planning talks. We told Gibson that Henry Owen and his colleagues would be unable to come to Brazil before June 30 because of travel and budget restrictions and that previous commitments prevented Owen from participating in the talks in July and August. Therefore, if Gibson wished, Owen and his group would be able to come to Brazil at some actually convenient time sometime after September 1. At the same time, Ambassador Tuthill and Minister Belton thought that, even though the previous two sets of talks had been held in Washington, Gibson and his colleagues might prefer to go to Washington once again and, if so, expressed their opinion that this could be arranged. I also said at the meeting with Gibson that I thought that the policy planning talks could be arranged in Washington if the Brazilians desired so. (We did not say that Mr. Owen preferred the talks in Washington because we did not want to give the impression that he is unwilling to come to Brazil, but we made sure that Gibson knew that Washington as a site for the talks would be more than acceptable from the U.S. point of view.) Gibson said that he might prefer to have the talks in Washington because it would have the personal advantage of enabling him to take his wife along and to visit his step-daughter, who is married and lives in Alexandria. Gibson said

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