Document of the week! Intramilitary conflicts and the hardening of the regime: Castello Branco in the spotlight

Check out the full document in our collection: Air telegram from Niles W. Bond to the State Department reporting a conversation with Robert J. Alexander

Intramilitary conflicts and the hardening of the regime: Castello Branco in the spotlight

The context was one of great tension. The government White Castle I had just downloaded the Institutional Act number 2, extinguishing all political parties, reinstituting the president's arbitrary power to revoke parliamentary mandates and suspend citizens' political rights, playing into the hands of the Military Justice crimes against national security, and making the election of the future president of the Republic indirect. 

But, for some self-styled military sectors “hard line”, that was still not enough. They thought that Castello was being too lenient with “subversive” agents, including “communists”. They wanted, first of all, that the elections for state governors that had taken place at the beginning of October 1965 had not even happened; since they happened, they sought, at least, that the opposition candidates who had won states considered crucial, such as Minas Gerais and Guanabara (current city of Rio de Janeiro) – won by Israel Pinheiro It is Negrão de Lima, respectively, both from Social Democratic Party (PSD) –, at the very least, they would be prevented from taking up their positions. 

Castello had downloaded the AI-2, pressured by the crisis that the October 1965 elections had generated, but the presiding marshal wanted to guarantee, at least, the inauguration of the elected governors. The impasse with the hard line was set. 

In today's document of the week, we have an excellent opportunity to glimpse the political delicacy of that moment. One of the leading colonels of the self-styled “hard line”, Osnelli Martinelli, confides to an American university professor, Robert Alexander, that a scheme is being set up to overthrow Castello – yes, overthrow Castello! – before the scheduled inauguration of Negrão de Lima, which would take place in Guanabara on December 5, 1965. According to Martinelli, if Castello managed to pass the test on December 5, he would be able to remain in the presidency until the end of his term, in March from 1967.

Despite the tension that surrounded the period surrounding the appointment of the governor of Guanabara, the inauguration ended up taking place without a hitch. Castello had paid to see and had managed to resist pressure from elements of the so-called “hard line” to block the rise of opposition elected officials to power. Even with this resistance from Castello, the fact is that, with AI-2, the country had taken a significant step towards consolidating a long-term military dictatorship. 

The document of the week shows us, in any case, the complexity of military policy during the first dictatorial government, and how, for some, the dictatorship had not yet been sufficiently dictatorial.

Prof. Dr. Felipe Loureiro,

Deputy coordinator of NACE CNV-Brazil,

Institute of International Relations at the University of São Paulo